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When the world is storm-driven and the bad happens and the worse
that threatens are so urgent as to shut out everything else from view,
then we need to know all the strong fortresses of the spirit which men
have built through the ages.
- David McCullough'
I. INTRODUCTION
The devastation wrought by the 2005 hurricane season brought into
bold relief the need for comprehensive debris management plans in the
United States. As cleanup efforts following Hurricane Katrina com-
menced, it became evident that local governments were not prepared to
deal with the debris problem's massive scope.
As the state government in Louisiana attempted to bridge the com-
munication and readiness gap between the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency ("FEMA") and the impacted local governments, the
Louisiana Attorney General's Office issued several opinions addressing
the rights and duties of the various parties.2 While these opinions were
helpful guides in the debris management process following Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, it became apparent that this was a national - and not
just a local - problem.3 Because of this realization, the opinion authors
(most of whom are also authors of this Article) felt it necessary to pro-
vide guidance to other jurisdictions in the hopes that they will be better
prepared to handle debris issues that may accompany future natural or
anthropogenic disasters.4
This Article is a culmination of the research for the original Attor-
ney General opinions, as well as subsequent work. It should provide
lawmakers and local administrators with the knowledge to navigate
FEMA's confusing rules on debris management from a legal perspec-
1. Medal Honors McCullough, Anvoc. (Baton Rouge, La.), Dec. 22, 2006, at 8B (quoting
historian David McCullough).
2. See, e.g., Op. Att'y Gen. La. 05-0381 (2005), 2005 WL 3635643; Op. Att'y Gen. La. 05-
0373 (2005), 2005 WL 3115350; Op. Att'y Gen. La. 05-0360 (2005), 2005 WL 2865900; Op.
Att'y Gen. La. 05-0360-A (2005), 2005 WL 2865901.
3. This sentiment is supported by the information presented in a recent article, which noted
that "[tihe United States is at [a] 'significant risk' of natural disaster. In the past two decades, the
President has declared over 700 major disasters. Many of these disaster events have generated
substantial volumes of debris that result in enormous challenges for local communities." Kathryn
A. Wasik, Municipal Liability for Disaster Debris Disposal, 19 TUL. ENvmt. L.J. 339, 353 (2006)
(internal footnotes omitted).
4. It should be noted that anthropogenic disasters are treated somewhat differently from
natural disasters by FEMA. See, e.g., Ernest B. Abbott, Representing Local Governments in
Catastrophic Events: DHSIFEMA Response and Recovery Issues, 37 URn. LAW. 467, 468 (2005)
(providing a comprehensive discussion of the differences between FEMA's treatment of
anthropogenic disasters and natural disasters).
[Vol. 61:11351136
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tive, as well as to ensure that those leaders are prepared for the worst in
their own communities before the worst happens.
Although recent events have focused the nation's attention on hur-
ricane damage in the southeastern United States, the need for compre-
hensive debris management plans is not so geographically limited.
Virtually no portion of the United States is immune from disaster: the
western portion of the country suffers from periodic earthquakes, mud-
slides, fires, and volcanic activity;5 the Pacific region is threatened
yearly by typhoons and perennial dangers from seismic activity and tsu-
namis;6 the Midwest is at risk for floods, tornadoes, and earthquakes;7
the Southeast, Atlantic seaboard, and Caribbean territories are in the
path of tropical cyclones; 8 and the entire nation is at risk of such anthro-
pogenic disasters as those resulting from terrorist activities.9 These
5. See, e.g., Peggy Andersen, Scientists: St. Helens Eruption Slowing, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Sept. 30, 2006 (discussing recent volcanic activity in Washington state); Richard K. De Atley,
Fatigue Factor: 4,000 Firefighters on Hand; Largest Blaze 50 Percent Contained; Man's Body
Found, PRESS ENTERPRISE (Riverside, CA), July 16, 2006, at Al (discussing one instance of
Western wildfires); Steve Fetbrandt, Mudslides Weigh on San Jacinto; Strategy: Residents Push
for Precautions as Officials Tout Long-Term and Multiagency Plans, PRESS ENTERPRISE
(Riverside, CA), Sept. 23, 2006, at BO (reporting mudslide problems in California); Martin Weil,
Violent Earthquake Strikes Northern California, Killing Dozens, Causing Widespread Damage;
Sections of Bridge, Highway Collapse in Rush Hour, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1989, at Al
(discussing the impact of the 1989 San Francisco earthquake).
6. See, e.g., Alexandre da Silva, Hawaii Tests Tsunami, Hurricane Preparedness,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 17, 2006 (describing mock disaster drills in Hawaii); President Bush
Declares Major Disaster in Northern Mariana Islands, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 28, 2004
(reporting the devastation following typhoon); Quake Disaster Loans Run into the Millions,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 15, 2006 (discussing expenses related to magnitude 6.7 earthquake in
Hawaii in 2006).
7. See, e.g., FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, MIDWEST TORNADOES OF MAY 3, 1999:
OBSERVATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND TECHNICAL GUIDANCE, at xi-xii (1999) (reviewing the
impact of one day of devastating tornadoes in Oklahoma and Kansas); Mark Hagen, Midwest
Farmers Still Feel '93 Flood's Effects, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 27, 1994, at 30 (discussing the
impact of substantial Midwest flooding); More Twisters Hit Texas; 6 States Clear Wreckage, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 15, 1990, at I IA (discussing the fallout from tornado damage in six
Midwestern states); Betsy Taylor, New Madrid Earthquake Preparation Poses Unique
Challenges, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 2, 2006 (discussing the potential for Midwest earthquakes).
8. See, e.g., JAY BARNES, NORTH CAROLINA'S HURRICANE HISTORY (rev. ed. 1998)
(reviewing North Carolina's hurricane history); GORDON E. DUNN & BANNER I. MILLER,
ATLANTIC HURRICANES 244-78 (1964) (reviewing general hurricane history); JAMES A. HENRY,
KENNETH M. PORTIER & JAN COYNE, THE CLIMATE AND WEATHER OF FLORIDA, 169-218 (1994)
(reviewing Florida's hurricane history); NEWS & COURIER & EVENING POST .... AND HUGO WAS
HIS NAME (1989) (discussing the devastation of Hurricane Hugo in South Carolina); Katherine
Bouma, Stormy Years Predicted For State - Global Warming Invites Droughts, Hurricanes,
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Nov. 3, 2006, at IC (noting predictions for increased hurricanes and other
calamities in Alabama in coming years); Tropical Storm Chris Nears Caribbean, CHATANOOGA
TIMES FREE PRESS, Aug. 2, 2006, at C6 (discussing threats posed to Caribbean territories from a
2006 hurricane). See generally PETE DAVIES, INSIDE THE HURRICANE: FACE To FACE WITH
NATURE'S DEADLIEST STORMS (2000) (recounting general hurricane history).
9. See, e.g., Julie DelCour, Why?: Oklahoma Scarred by Incomprehensible Tragedy, TULSA
2007] 1137
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events have the potential to leave massive quantities of debris, both on
public and private property, 10 threaten public health and safety and the
environment, and hinder the rebuilding and recovery process."
II. WE'RE FROM THE GOVERNMENT, AND WE'RE
HERE TO CONFUSE You
When disaster strikes, there often is not much time for the quiet
contemplation characteristically necessary to interpret federal law. Not
long after the 2005 storms, two major concerns emerged: (1) what to do
with all the debris; and (2) who would pay for its cleanup. While the tax
base for local governments had been scattered across the country during
the mass exodus from South Louisiana due to Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita,' 2 the political subdivisions were rightfully concerned that they
would not be able to afford the costs of debris removal and cleanup.
Accordingly, they turned to the State for answers, and the State, in turn,
turned to FEMA. Thankfully, FEMA has reimbursement provisions in
its Public Assistance ("PA") program; 13 correctly interpreting the law in
a disaster's wake to ensure that local governments' expenses are cov-
ered, however, can be maddening. Being able to correctly navigate the
complex maze of FEMA laws, rules, and regulations is essential; as
Abbott remarked, "because FEMA programs are reimbursement pro-
grams, where FEMA provides grant funding of expenditures already
WORLD, Dec. 31, 1995, at NI (reviewing the devastation wrought by home-grown terrorists in
wake of Oklahoma City bombing in 1995); Two Planes Strike World Trade Center; Terrorists
Blamed; Aircraft Crashes near Pentagon, BuFFALo NEWS, Sept. 11, 2001, at Al (providing an
early news report of the 9/11 terrorist attacks).
10. See, e.g., Joe Cantlupe & Dana Wilkie, San Diego Battles FEMA for Millions over Fire
Debris, COPLEY NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 22, 2004 (reviewing San Diego's recent problems getting
FEMA reimbursement for removal of fire debris from private property, despite studies showing
hazardous nature); Shearon Roberts, Jefferson Makes Mulch After the Wind Blows; Plan
Streamlines Storm Debris Removal, TIMEs-PIcAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 4, 2005, at 1 (noting
substantial amounts of green debris on public and private property in the New Orleans area
following Tropical Storm Cindy in 2005); Patrick Whittle, A Lesson from the Panhandle;
Escambia County Finds a Way to Win FEMA's Help with Cleanup, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB.,
Dec. 3, 2004, at Al (discussing Florida's problems with debris removal from private property in
2004).
11. See, e.g., Paul Rioux, Reconstruction Plans Begin in St. Bernard but Oil Spill Adds to the
Health Risks, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Sept. 10, 2005, at A13 (commenting that
"[r]ebuilding ... will be a gargantuan task in a parish where almost every structure took in from
10 to 20 feet of water and roads were still blocked by debris").
12. Melinda DeSlatte, Katrina Leaves Louisiana's Budget Tattered, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept.
8, 2005.
13. "Under the PA Program, which is authorized by the Stafford Act, FEMA awards grants to
assist State and local governments and certain Private Nonprofit (PNP) entities with the response
to and recovery from disasters." FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, FEMA 322: PUBLIC AssISTAcE GUIDE 3 (1999) [hereinafter FEMA-322]. Much of
this assistance is provided in the form of reimbursement grants. Id. at 4.
1138 [Vol. 61:1135
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made by a community, it becomes particularly important for a commu-
nity to understand what is eligible for federal assistance."14 If local gov-
ernments do not get eligibility right, their penalty may be the inability to
obtain reimbursement for their massive debris management
expenditures. 15
A. The Stafford Act
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act ("Stafford Act"), originally enacted as the Disaster Relief Act of
1974,16 provides FEMA with broad authority to assist local governments
with debris removal. 7 Primarily, FEMA employs Section 403(A)(2) of
the Stafford Act for disaster-related debris matters.' 8 This provision
empowers the president to authorize grants to "any state or local govern-
ment for the purpose of removing debris and wreckage resulting from a
major disaster from publicly or privately owned lands and waters."' 9 At
first blush, this provision appears to be a godsend for local governments
inundated with debris and debt following a disaster. As can be seen
infra, the same picture emerges from the regulations promulgated pursu-
ant to Stafford Act authority. 2° After analyzing FEMA's internal rules
and publications, however, the facially simple process for securing cer-
tain types of debris removal reimbursement grants, especially for debris
removed from private property, is complicated. The actual application
of the law and regulations becomes convoluted as it works its way
through FEMA's process. This makes it difficult to navigate the specific
requirements for reimbursement.
B. FEMA Rules and Regulations
The regulations that control reimbursement for debris removal from
FEMA are found at 44 C.F.R. § 206.224.21 Part (a) of this section indi-
cates that "[u]pon a determination that debris removal is in the public
14. See Abbott, supra note 4, at 468.
15. See, e.g., FEMA-322, supra note 13, at 89 (noting that "FEMA may be required to
deobligate funds after the initiation of a project" for failure to comply with certain laws).
16. Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The name was later changed to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Amendments
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-707, 102 Stat. 4689.
17. § 403, 88 Stat. at 143; see also 42 U.S.C. § 5173(a) (2006).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 5173(A)(2).
19. Id.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 21-24.
21. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, RECOVERY Div.
POLICY No. 9523.13, DEBRIs REMOVAL FROM PRIVATE PROPERTY 2 (2001) [hereinafter FEMA-
9523.13] (citing 44 C.F.R. § 206.224 (2001)).
20071 1139
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interest, the Regional Director may provide assistance for the removal of
debris and wreckage from publicly and privately owned lands and
waters."22 Although this portion of the regulation largely tracks the deb-
ris removal provisions of the Stafford Act, it does not detail what "pub-
lic interest" means. This term is explained in pertinent part in 44 C.F.R.
§ 206.224(a)(1-4):
Such removal is in the public interest when it is necessary to:
1) Eliminate immediate threats to life, public health, and safety; or
2) Eliminate immediate threats of significant damage to improved
public or private property; or
3) Ensure economic recovery of the affected community to the bene-
fit of the community-at-large; or
4) Mitigate the risk to life and property by removing substantially
damaged structures and associated appurtenances as needed to con-
vert property acquired through a FEMA hazard mitigation program to
uses compatible with open space, recreation, or wetlands manage-
23ment practices.
Read as a whole, this portion of the regulation seems to set in place a
straightforward process to allow for reimbursement for debris removal.
FEMA, however, has somewhat complicated this seemingly easy pro-
cess with 44 C.F.R. § 206.224(b), which singles out debris removal from
private property despite the fact that this type of debris appears to be
covered in 44 C.F.R. § 206.224(a). Part (b) states that "[w]hen it is in
the public interest for an eligible applicant to remove debris from private
property in urban, suburban and rural areas, including large lots, clear-
ance of the living, recreational and working area is eligible except those
areas used for crops and livestock and unused areas. 2 4
Singling out private property in this way, though not seeming to
imply any different approach from public property, indicates that FEMA
intends to treat private property differently from public property.25 In
addition to this oddity, the "may provide" language in 44 C.F.R.
§ 206.224(a) gives FEMA Regional Directors broad discretion to condi-
tion the award of reimbursement funds for local governments, compli-
cating the cleanup process by ensuring that no cleanup will follow the
exact same rules for each disaster. As a practical matter, even though
the Regional Directors have latitude to vary, the requirements are often
the same. 6
22. 44 C.F.R. § 206.224(a).
23. Id.
24. 44 C.F.R. § 206.224(b).
25. Id.
26. For example, compare the similar policy provisions in the documention contained in FED.
EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE POLICY
1140 [Vol. 61:1135
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Pending approval by a Regional Director, cleanup on public prop-
erty is easily reimbursable.2 7 Generally, reimbursement for public prop-
erty cleanup should be broadly approved, with compensation proceeding
according to a fixed schedule at the outset of cleanup operations,
allowing for debris removal from public roads and waterways, among
other things, to proceed as quickly as possible. 28 Thus, although local
governments should not rely on history to assure that they will be reim-
bursed for such expenditures (due to the broad discretion granted to the
Regional Directors to provide such assistance), there is a reasonable
expectation that pursuant to a declared emergency, FEMA will authorize
these reimbursements.29
Debris removal from private property presents a different situation.
Generally, FEMA requires private property owners to utilize their own
resources to clean up their property. 30  The assumption behind this
approach is that, unlike local governments who might be self-insured or
whose operation is necessary for the continued function of an area, dam-
age to private property is typically insured and its rapid cleanup is not
always necessary to ensure the economic and social viability of an
area.3 Basically, FEMA does not want to pay unnecessarily if someone
else will pay. However, FEMA contemplates that local governments
may, under extreme circumstances, have to pay for (and thus will need
reimbursement for) the cleanup of certain private property. FEMA
states its rule on this possibility as follows:
If debris on private business and residential property is so widespread
that public health, safety, or the economic recovery of the community
is threatened, the actual removal of debris from the private property
may be eligible . . . Debris removal from private property shall not
take place until the State or local government has agreed in writing to
indemnify FEMA from a claim arising from such removal and
obtained unconditional authorization to remove the debris from pri-
32vate property.
What, then, is the problem? Why is it so complicated to initiate
REFERENCE MANUAL 45-102 (2007), available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/govemment/grant/pa/
policy.pdf.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 5173(A)(2) (2006).
28. See, e.g., FEMA-322, supra note 13, at 45.
29. Abbott also cautions that municipalities should wait for FEMA clearance for debris
removal to ensure that funds are available. Abbott, supra note 4, at 482-83.
30. FEMA-322, supra note 13, at 46.
31. Id. An example of private property debris removal that would not be essential for the
recovery process of a community to proceed would be a few fallen tree limbs in the yards of
private residences. Such debris may be obnoxious to the landowners, but its removal is by no
means essential to the function of society.
32. Id.
2007]
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cleanup operations on private property? The answers to these questions
are in the post-disaster policy statements FEMA issues setting forth the
requirements for obtaining reimbursement approval for conducting pri-
vate property debris operations.33 Part of these agreements' boilerplate
language requires strict compliance with all local laws in the execution
of debris cleanup. As punishment for noncompliance, FEMA can refuse
to reimburse local governments for their share of the expenses.34 Such a
reality can be a deal-breaker for local governments that seldom have the
wherewithal to cover the full expenses of this debris removal. Thus, to
secure reimbursement funding, the entity performing the cleanup must
comply with all local - in addition to state and federal - laws.
What does compliance with local laws mean? Generally, this state-
ment requires observance of any local or state laws that set forth the due
process procedures for right-of-entry onto private property, including
cases involving the condemnation or demolition of private structures.
In short, to facilitate the rehabilitation of a battered area, governments
cannot run roughshod over citizens' rights to their private property. As
discussed throughout this Article, in times of emergency these require-
ments can be burdensome, if not impossible, to follow and difficult to
navigate with the precision and expediency necessary to return to
normalcy.
This situation presents a palpable tension. On the one hand, dire
circumstances call for quick and decisive leadership to clean up the mess
left by massive disasters so that the rebuilding process can commence.
In that sense, time is of the essence. Without prompt action, there is a
danger that recovery in a devastated area may never occur. On the other
hand, FEMA requires that unless victims are afforded due process, it
will not reimburse local governments for the cleanup. The linchpin of
this policy guarantees that governments treat citizens who have been
victimized by disasters and compensate them fairly and evenhandedly
for any taking that may occur.
The irony, however, is that these requirements bring the entire pro-
cess to a standstill. Giving notice to every landowner whose property
has been impacted is often impractical because, in many instances, it is
33. See, e.g., FEMA-9523.13, supra note 21, at 2-4. This document notes that local laws
must be observed in order for approval to be granted. Id. at 2. It also notes that the affected
states' attorneys general must prepare a document that discusses and analyzes the constitutional
and statutory authority for right-of-entry, demolition, and debris removal on private property in
the event that the local and state laws cannot be followed due to extenuating circumstances. Id. at
4.
34. See, e.g., FEMA-322, supra note 13, at 89 (noting that "FEMA may be required to
deobligate funds after the initiation of a project" for failure to comply with certain laws).
35. See FEMA-9523.13, supra note 21, at 4.
[Vol. 61:11351142
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difficult to locate the landowners in the aftermath of massive disasters.36
Additionally, the cost of following state statutes or local ordinances that
typically apply in condemnation/demolition situations is often unduly
expensive. 37 The central question in this instance thus becomes whether
there is any way to relax due process requirements in a disaster to permit
the cleanup and recovery to begin. The answer to that question is in the
affirmative. But any disaster debris programs set in place in advance of
inevitable calamities must follow a strict set of triggering mechanisms
and roll-back procedures so that they cannot be misused in either times
of calm or after the emergency has abated and compliance with normal
due process is once again possible. Additionally, governments contem-
plating the implementation of ad hoc debris management programs are
cautioned that in no way can they be authorized to summarily dispense
with due process requirements in an emergency or any other situation.38
Some measures of process must always be afforded.
Further, such streamlining does not constitute authorization for the
haphazard or indiscriminate demolition of structures that threaten public
health. The determination whether to demolish structures or to enter
private property should be made on a structure-by-structure or tract-by-
tract basis. This is especially true in the case of the historic properties,
discussed below. Each determination to enter, to alter, or to demolish
structures must be undertaken with due respect and sensitivity to the
rights and interests of those affected by such action. Ultimately, how-
ever, the final decision regarding debris removal, right of entry, and
demolition should rest with the local authorities.
III. RIGHT-OF-ENTRY, DEBRIS REMOVAL, AND DEMOLITION
Although common sense would dictate that the initial action trig-
gering the ability to receive federal reimbursement for debris removal
would be the disaster, curiously the federal government requires a
"major disaster" declaration for the affected areas from both the presi-
dent and the respective state governor.39 If a state does not obtain the
requisite presidential declaration, it simply will not have access to
36. See, e.g., A Statistical Look at the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, ASSOCIATED PRESs,
Sept. 10, 2005 (noting that more than one million people were forced to leave their homes).
37. See generally Blanco v. Burton, No. Civ.A 06-3813, 2006 WL 2366046, at *20 (E.D. La.
Aug. 14, 2006) ("Indeed, compliance with federal law can be a costly and bothersome
proposition.").
38. See cases cited infra notes 53-55.
39. FEMA-322, supra note 13, at 2-3; see also Abbott, supra note 4, at 470-71. Abbott also
notes that it is imperative that what the President issues is a "major disaster" declaration and not
merely an "emergency" declaration, as the former allows FEMA to provide more comprehensive
assistance under the PA program. Id. at 471.
20071 1143
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FEMA debris reimbursement. 40  That being said, in disasters requiring
federal assistance, it would be unusual for the president not to make
such a declaration.4'
Following Hurricane Rita, for example, Louisiana encountered a
situation in which the regions declared "disaster areas" were not wide
enough to capture all of the land that had been substantially impacted by
the storm.42  Despite reports of massive damage outside of the emer-
gency zone,43 the practical effect of this designation precluded citizens
from applying for and ultimately obtaining FEMA assistance.' Local
governments need to be aware of the possibility of such an oversight on
the part of politicians because debris cleanup operations in those areas
will not be eligible for reimbursement, thereby leaving local residents to
bear the burden of cleanup costs. Instead, local leaders should ensure
that their state and federal counterparts are aware of the devastation their
area has endured so they are not left out of federal assistance programs
when the cleanup begins.
With the declaration of a "major disaster" by the president, FEMA
will issue a local disaster-specific policy for debris removal. 45 Follow-
ing such issuance, the state and local governments will be presented with
indemnification agreements into which they must first enter before
40. Abbott, supra note 4, at 471-72. Under the Stafford Act, FEMA is not authorized to
provide assistance without a presidential declaration. 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2007).
41. Although this statement is grounded in common sense, which would dictate that a
president would declare a disaster where necessary to start the flow of federal dollars, some
scholars have suggested that such is not always the case. See THOMAS A. GARRETr & RUSSELL S.
SOBEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FEMA DISASTER PAYMENTS, WORKING PAPER SERIES,
WORKING PAPER 2002-012B, at 11 (2002), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2002/
2002-012.pdf. See generally Andrew Reeves, POLITcIAL DISASTER? DISASTER DECLARATIONS
AND ELECTORAL POLITCS (2005), available at http://www.gov.harvard.edulstudentlreeves/fema.
pdf.
42. Bob Anderson, Livingston Finally Declared Federal Disaster Area, ADvoc. (Baton
Rouge, La.), Oct. 16, 2005, at 3 (noting the problems of access to federal assistance for Livingston
Parish as a result of having been left out of the declared emergency areas following Hurricane
Rita).
43. Id.
44. "The damaged facility must be located, or the work must be performed, within the
designated area to be eligible for public assistance." FEMA-322, supra note 13, at 24. This
problem has also been discussed by Abbott, supra note 4, at 472. In discussing the scope of a
disaster declaration, Abbott notes that
[i]f a county is included in the declaration for purposes of the public assistance
program, then all public entities in that county, and certain nonprofit ones, who have
incurred damage from the disaster event are eligible for federal disaster grants. If a
county is not included, or a particular assistance program is not activated for that
county, then no federal assistance is available, without regard to the scope of
damage suffered by any particular entity.
Id.
45. See, e.g., FEMA-9523.13, supra note 21, at 2.
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FEMA will authorize reimbursement for cleanup activities.46 These
documents help formulate the rules regarding how a specific debris
operation must be conducted. We cannot underscore enough the neces-
sity that state and local governments comply with these documents' pro-
visions. The penalty for failing to do so is severe: Although FEMA
may liberally write checks to facilitate cleanup and reconstruction on the
front end of a disaster, if the FEMA Inspector General later finds dis-
crepancies or a failure to adhere to the agreements' confines, state and
local governments might find themselves stuck with a bill from the fed-
eral government seeking reimbursement.
In addition, state and local governments must wait for FEMA's
approval before commencing debris removal from private property.47
FEMA will agree to "work with each State to designate those areas
where the debris is so widespread that removal of the debris from private
property is in the 'public interest' under 44 C.F.R. § 206.224 and thus
eligible for FEMA reimbursement. '48 Louisiana's experience with Hur-
ricane Katrina clearly demonstrated the unique nature of cleanup opera-
tions on private property and the need to await guidance from FEMA
before proceeding with such activities.
In extreme situations, debris removal may require the complete
demolition of a private structure in order to ensure the protection of
public health and safety. At a minimum, it will require entry onto pri-
vate property, which could constitute a trespass if the local government
does not have the proper waivers. As a general rule, local authorities
should only demolish structures as a last resort, and they should secure
waivers for right-of-entry, debris removal, and demoliti6n from private
property owners whenever possible. Unfortunately, people often flee in
the wake of disasters, making it difficult to locate property owners.4 9
Thus, local authorities need to be able to expedite the debris removal
and demolition process without worrying about violating the law.
To comply with FEMA regulations, debris removal and entry onto
private property must be accomplished according to established munici-
pal ordinances.5° This raises two major problems: (1) many localities
affected by a disaster may not have municipal ordinances granting local
46. FEMA-322, supra note 13, at 46.
47. See Abbott, supra note 4, at 481-83 (cautioning municipalities to await FEMA clearance
before commencing debris operations).
48. FEMA-9523.13, supra note 21, at 2.
49. See, e.g., Michael Graczyk, Legacy of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita is Thousands of New
Texans, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 24, 2005 (noting the mass exodus of New Orleanians to Texas
in the wake of Hurricane Katrina).
50. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, FEMA
PUBLICATION 325, DEBRIS MANAGEMENT GUIDE, 35 (1999) [hereinafter FEMA-325].
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officials a right-of-entry onto private property under such circumstances;
and (2) where such ordinances do exist, they are often burdened with
specific notice and other due process requirements which frustrate
speedy recovery efforts.
Because of these shortcomings in local laws, state and local gov-
ernments should enact a law protecting the public's health and safety by
providing for right-of-entry, debris removal, and demolition that is only
triggered in emergency circumstances. We propose a hypothetical
example of such a statute in Appendix 1.5 In the alternative, states
may choose to follow the structure based on Louisiana law5 2 to deal with
inadequate or absent local laws in the event of a disaster.
Speaking directly to the issue of debris removal or property demoli-
tion, Louisiana case law provides ample support for emergency munici-
pal activities, undertaken in the general public's best interest, which
would otherwise constitute a derogation of due process. In 1882, the
Louisiana Supreme Court, with respect to the police power, noted that
[t]here are cases where it becomes necessary for the public authorities
to interfere with the control by individuals, of their property, and
even to destroy it, when the owners themselves have fully observed
all their duties to their fellows and to the State, but where, neverthe-
less, some controlling public necessity demands the interference or
destruction. Strong instances exist where it becomes necessary to
take, use or destroy the private property of individuals, to prevent the
spreading of a fire, the ravages of pestilence, the advance of a hostile
army, or any other great public calamity.53
Thus, it is well-settled that the interests of individual citizens may be
outweighed by the necessity of engaging in debris removal and demoli-
51. See infra app. 1.
52. It is reasonable to expect that other jurisdictions likely have similar jurisprudence. See,
e.g., Friedman v. City of L.A., 125 Cal. Rptr. 93, 95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (noting that due process
for demolition may be relaxed in emergency situations, saying "[i]n the absence of an absolute
emergency, essential elements of due process of law include notice and opportunity to be heard");
see also Thain v. City of Palo Alto, 24 Cal. Rptr. 515, 524 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962) (similarly noting
that "[iut is of course long and well recognized that as a general rule municipalities have the power
to provide for the summary abatement of nuisances by municipal officials, particularly where an
emergency exists"); City of Rapid City v. Boland, 271 N.W.2d 60, 66 (S.D. 1978) ("[T]he
destruction of sound and substantial buildings has been allowed without due process and without
compensation where the destruction or damage was, or reasonably appeared to be, necessary to
prevent an impending or imminent public disaster from fire, flood, disease, or riot") (internal
citations omitted)).
53. Bass v. State, 34 La. Ann. 494, 496 (La. 1882). This case has also been cited in more
recent Louisiana Supreme Court cases as authority for justifying takings without compensation.
See, e.g., Avenal v. State, 2003-3521 (La. 10/19/04); 886 So. 2d 1085, 1107 (citing Bass, 34 La.
Ann. 494); see also New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, 2002-CA-
0991 (La. 9/4/02); 825 So. 2d 1098, 1104.
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tion during a state of emergency.5 4 Even though legal precedents sup-
port the suspension of due process in exigent circumstances, there is no
guarantee that this suspension of due process will also insulate a munici-
pality from lawsuits resulting from the taking of private property.
In situations where no municipal ordinances granting a right-of-
entry or a right to demolish exist, local laws consequently cannot be
followed because no law exists, making compliance with FEMA
requirements impossible.5 5 Therefore, in instances where local ordi-
nances have not already been enacted, the local governing authority
must create them before reimbursable work can commence. Many
states' statutes provide for the creation of such new ordinances.56
In Louisiana, for example, the legislature enacted section 33:1236,
Louisiana Revised Statutes, which defines the powers of local governing
authorities.57 Section 33:1236 addresses the power of local governing
authorities to enact ordinances prohibiting public nuisances, such as
"unhealthful growths, trash, debris, refuse, or discarded or noxious mat-
ter"; 58 the statute also deals with the "repair and condemnation of build-
ings, dwellings, and other structures that have become derelict and
present a danger" to residents' health and welfare.59 Additionally, sec-
tion 33:1236 empowers local governing authorities to enact ordinances
regulating both debris removal from private property and the condemna-
tion and demolition of structures for public health and safety reasons.6 °
All states should create similar laws in advance of any potential disaster
situations so that they can easily navigate and apply the law in the event
of a disaster.
Alternatively, in Louisiana, and perhaps in other jurisdictions, legal
provisions permit local leaders to act unilaterally in the face of a disas-
ter. For example, section 29:737, Louisiana Revised Statutes, grants
municipal chief executive officers the authority to issue orders "to pre-
serve the public peace, property, health, or safety within the municipal-
ity."' 6' Under this authority, a municipal chief executive may issue
54. See also Givens v. Town of Ruston, 55 So. 2d 289, 291-92 (La. Ct. App. 1951) (noting a
town which removed limbs from privately owned trees following a wind storm acted "within its
rights" and in the best interest of the public).
55. This means FEMA has basic right-of-entry and demolition requirements that must be
followed in order to ensure reimbursement. Without a municipal-level process for following such
requirements, there is no clear way to comply with the FEMA mandates.
56. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 36-61-11; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-4759 (2005); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 40-58-18 (1989); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 3-46-43 (1978).
57. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:1236 (2006).
58. E.g., § 33:1236(21)(b)(i).
59. § 33:1236(49)(a)(i).
60. § 33:1236(49)(a)(i).
61. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:737(A).
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orders that reflect the same goals as ordinances municipal officers can
create under section 33:1236. Such an approach, however, would
require the creation of new orders once a disaster is already underway.
Thus, it is preferable to have municipal ordinances already in place in
order to ensure compliance with the law and, also, FEMA reimburse-
ment. Additionally, this preferred approach avoids the possibility that
an elected official may not want to institute such measures for political
reasons when they are urgently needed.62 The preferred approach also
avoids potential ultra vires attacks on government officials that have
been instituted in Louisiana in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita.63
Such ordinances - those municipal officers can create under section
33:1236 and those we propose in Appendix 1 - should also be narrowly
tailored to fit the specific needs of the local government because effects
of a disaster are unique to a given area. Accordingly, an ordinance can
be specially crafted to both respond to these potential effects and to min-
imize impairment of due process rights under all conditions. Moreover,
in enacting such ordinances, the governing authorities of the affected
local governments must comply with the standard laws and practices for
the creation of ordinances because failure to do so could result in a
denial of FEMA reimbursement. 64 Naturally, this would thwart the
attempts of local governments to obtain FEMA reimbursement for sub-
sequent work.
Some local ordinances contain language that would permit govern-
ment agents or their designees to enter private property.65 In instances
where such authority may exist, there are still concerns about providing
62. This is based on the presumption that it might be politically unpopular for a municipal
chief to unilaterally order the demolition of private structures, while the enacting of ordinances to
do so by a municipal legislative body might not present such a political gamble.
63. See, e.g., Plaintiffs Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Damages at 1, G&T Inv. of
La., L.L.C. v. Jefferson Parish, No. 537681 (La. 19th Jud. Dist. Ct. Nov. 2, 2005) (claiming that
various state and local officials exceeded their authority in the issuance of emergency orders
following Hurricane Katrina).
64. See, e.g., FEMA-322, supra note 13, at 63-87.
65. See, e.g., PHOENIX, ARIZ., CODE § 39-10 (2007) (permitting government officials to enter
private property to remove graffiti), available at http://phoenix.gov/CITYCODE/chO39.html;
LAWRENCE, KAN., CODE § 9-904(F)(3) (2001) (permitting government officials to enter private
property to remove debris obstructing stormwater management practices), available at http://www
.ci.lawrence.ks.us/publicworks/pdf/stormwater-pollutionordinance.pdf; BARDSTOWN, Ky., CODE
§ 51-03(E) (2005) (permitting government officials to enter private property to collect solid
waste), available at http://www.cityofbardstown.org/pdf/ordinances/B2005-22SOLID%20
WASTE%20MANAGEMENT.pdf; JACKSON, TENN., CODE § 13-208 (1999) (permitting
government officials to enter private property to remove abandoned vehicles), available at http://
www. cityofjackson .net/departments/buildingcodes /Abandoned%20Vehicle%200rdinance. pdf;
ALAMO, TEX., CODE § 6-5-4 (2001) (permitting government officials to enter private property to
remove abandoned vehicles), available at http://www.alamotexas.org/vertical/Sites/%7BEC3F575
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due process to the affected landowners if their property is to be substan-
tially altered or demolished to protect public health and safety.
The suspension of constitutional requirements, as embedded and
reflected in local ordinances, must be addressed here as well. First, if
ordinances exist that are sufficient to satisfy the reimbursement require-
ments of FEMA, then the notice and due process protections must some-
times be circumvented in emergency situations. This is because it may
be impossible to provide adequate notice to affected landowners before
entering or altering their private property for the greater good of the
general public. Indeed, FEMA in Policy Number 9523.13 recognized
the existence of such circumstances in "Alabama, Louisiana, Missis-
sippi, and Texas," making compliance with the normal condemnation
and abatement procedures impractical. 66
To return some semblance of normalcy and or operability to
affected areas, debris removal and health-hazard abatement must begin
quickly following a disaster. In the interests of accomplishing these
goals, it may be impractical, if not completely impossible, to comply
with the typical due process requirements associated with right-of-entry
and/or condemnation proceedings. As a basic notion, the law does not
require the performance of "vain and useless" acts.67 In some situations,
attempting to contact all of a disaster area's affected residents to gain
right-of-entry waivers or provide them with notice and a hearing before
removing debris from their property could indeed represent a vain effort
on behalf of local governments and would unduly hamper recovery
efforts. Thus, in rare instances where notice is not possible, and only in
instances where a hearing is not practical, such measures must be
circumvented.
Persuasive legal authority supporting a governmental entity's abil-
ity to bypass the due process requirements of notice and hearing in the
wake of a disaster exists in various jurisdictions across the country.6 8
Because it is not always possible to obtain the necessary waivers prior to
commencing such work, FEMA has established documentation checkl-
ists for authorities to follow in such instances. 69 FEMA also recom-
mends that local authorities document their reasons for not obtaining
these documents. °
D-24A7-41 DO-B797-BB213C758E6D%7D/uploads/%7BE EEA549-F2A9-4806-9E57-530EB65
B5CI 8%7D.PDF.
66. FEMA-9523.13, supra note 21, at 1-2.
67. See, e.g., Moore v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 203 So. 2d 548, 553 (La. 1967).
68. See cases cited supra notes 52-54.
69. See FEMA-325, supra note 50, at 35-36.
70. Id. (authorities should document reasons for not obtaining executed "right-of-entry and
hold harmless" agreements).
2007] 1149
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
The most notable case allowing for the suspension of due process
requirements under emergency circumstances is North American Cold
Storage Co. v. Chicago.7 In that case, the Court held that if a public
health hazard justifies immediate action, governmental actors can bypass
the need for hearings to ascertain the parties' interests before acting.
This case is analogous to the situation following many disasters in which
hazards on private property cause a potential threat to public health and
require a quick governmental response, undeterred by the fact that the
private owners are not available to be notified or provided a hearing.
Similarly, in Hall v. McGuigan, the Delaware Superior Court found that
if following due process procedures prior to a taking was impractical
due to exigent circumstances, the application of these procedures on a
post hoc basis was sufficient.72
Together, these cases stand for the premise that even in situations
where compensation may be necessary, the notice and comment period
may be suspended until after the debris removal or demolition has
occurred and the emergency has abated. More to the point, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that "[s]ummary governmental
action taken in emergencies and designed to protect the public health,
safety and general welfare does not violate due process. ' 73 These cases
provide for a suspension of due process and notice requirements in the
event of a disaster. In addition, any emergency declarations that have
been made before the commencement of debris operations should fur-
ther justify immediate responses to public health and safety hazards. As
such, leaders of local governments with ordinances allowing right-of-
entry and demolition/debris removal from private property should be
able to issue executive orders suspending notice and due process rights
related to these matters. Such suspensions should be narrowly tailored
to meet the immediate needs of the particular disaster recovery and they
should be set to expire within a reasonable time.
IV. VEHICLES AS DEBRIS
Following a major disaster, it is not unusual for cars, boats, and
other vehicles to be displaced elsewhere, including on private property.74
71. N. Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
72. Id. at 1203; see also Srb v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 601 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Colo. Ct. App.
1979).
73. Armendariz v. Penman, 31 F.3d 860, 866 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Hodel v. Va. Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 299-300 (1981); United States v. Caltex
(Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1952); Miller v. Campbell County, 722 F. Supp. 687,
697 (D. Wyo. 1989); Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 41 Cal. Rptr. 368, 382-83 (Cal. 1995);
Rose v. City of Coalinga, 263 Cal. Rptr. 124, 128 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (citation omitted).
74. See, e.g., Hurricane Katrina Crushes 350,000 New Orleans Cars, NEW ORLEANS
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Dealing with these objects presents different problems from non-vehicu-
lar debris. For example, the private property on which these objects
come to rest may belong to a different individual, raising questions
about entry onto one party's property to recover another party's debris.
Another problem is deciding which party should receive notice of a sal-
vaged vehicle.
Many states have specific laws regarding abandoned vehicles,75 but
they seldom contemplate disaster situations. When a vehicle moves
from one piece of property to another as a result of a natural disaster, the
vehicle cannot truly be considered abandoned, but, rather, the owner of
the vehicle must be ascertained. Thus, the typical procedures that apply
to dealing with abandoned vehicles should not govern when such a vehi-
cle is removed from public or private property after a natural disaster.
Apart from the fact that these vehicles have not been abandoned in the
traditional sense, many of them are covered by insurance policies or
liens, and these insurance companies or lienholders would likely want to
identify the vehicles prior to their final disposition.
FEMA's general definition of debris includes vehicles.76 Thus,
vehicles may be removed from private property in the same fashion as
any other debris. As with all of the debris located on private property,
there must be an "immediate threat" to life, public health and safety, or
public or private property to justify the public entity's removal of the
debris, including vehicles, and ensure FEMA reimbursement for this
action.77
Vehicles, including, but not limited to cars and boats, present a sig-
nificant threat to the public health and safety, as well as to the environ-
ment, which necessitates their expedient removal from wherever they
are located. For example, vehicles threaten the safety of children who
might use them for play, and they damage land and groundwater if they
leak hazardous fluids. Such environmental and health hazards have
been noted by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality
("DEQ"). 8 DEQ has recognized hazards from automobiles including
"gasoline and diesel fuel, refrigerants, lubricating oils, mercury ABS
switches, mercury convenience switches, lead acid batteries, brake and
CITYBUSINESS, Sept. 23, 2005, at 1 (noting that thousands of vehicles were destroyed by
Hurricane Katrina); see also Steve Ritea, Cars, Boats Can Be Hauled off for Free; FEMA to
Finance Removal of Vehicles, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 26, 2006, at 1 (noting the
numerous vehicles that ended up on private property following Hurricane Katrina).
75. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 28.11.010 (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 4401 (2007); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 290-1 (2006).
76. See FEMA-325, supra note 50, at 22; FEMA-322, supra note 13, at 45.
77. See FEMA-325, supra note 50, at 21.
78. LA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, HURRICANE KATRINA DEBRIS MANAGEMENT PLAN
(2005).
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transmission fluid, antifreeze, and tires."7 9 DEQ has also recognized
hazards from boats including "gasoline and diesel fuel, refrigerants,
lubricating oils, mercury bilge switches, propane tanks, large appliances,
lead acid batteries, transmission fluid and electronics, such as, radar sets,
radios, GPS units, and depth finders."80 The removal of such vehicles
from private property, in addition to advancing the pertinent health,
safety, and environmental goals, also substantially advances a return to
normalcy for both vehicle owners and their insurers, who are likely
awaiting the identification and location of their property.
Quick removal of vehicles from both public and private property
ensures FEMA reimbursement and also protects the public by reducing
the chance that people acquire these vehicles to mask their damages and
sell them to unsuspecting consumers.8" Thus, entry onto private land to
remove vehicles left there by disasters is well within the scope of activi-
ties sought to protect the public's interests, health, safety, and the
environment.
In terms of notice and other due process rights, the same procedures
apply to vehicles as to all other types of debris. The underlying property
owners must receive some measure of post-hoc notice and hearing and,
once the owners of the vehicles have been identified, notice to them is
necessary as well.82 In addition, because most vehicles are insured, the
vehicles should not be discarded after the owner has been notified, but
rather the vehicles should be held in a staging area where insurance
adjusters can gain access to assess claims.83
Once a disaster situation has abated, vehicles can continue to pre-
sent a problem for governmental entities. One example of such a situa-
tion arose more than a year after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in
Louisiana. Louisiana's DEQ and Department of Public Safety ("DPS")
were charged with collecting and disposing of vehicles that had entered
the debris stream as a result of these storms.84 Pursuant to the Louisiana
Motor Vehicle and Traffic Regulation laws codified in section 32:471,
Louisiana Revised Statutes, DEQ was specifically obligated to send reg-
79. Id. at 6.
80. Id. at 7.
81. See, e.g., Greg Thomas, Car Trouble, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 13, 2006, at
1 (noting that it is suspected that numerous cars damaged by Hurricane Katrina may have been
stolen and sold as used cars in other states).
82. See LA. DEP'T OF ENVTm. QuALIrry, supra note 78, at 6.
83. See, e.g., Hurricane Katrina Crushes 350,000 New Orleans Cars, supra note 74 (noting
that the vehicles destroyed by Hurricane Katrina would be taken to staging areas for insurance
inspection).
84. Amy Wold, Storm Cleanup Falls to La. DEQ, ADVOC. (Baton Rouge, La.), Oct. 31, 2005,
at 2-B (noting DEQ was responsible for cleaning up over twenty-two million tons of debris after
hurricanes Katrina and Rita); see also Op. Att'y Gen. La. 07-0037 (2007), 2007 WL 1453785.
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istered or certified letters, return receipt requested, "to the last known
owner of the vehicles at his last known address informing him to remove
the vehicle within ten working days from date of receipt of notice."85
All motor vehicles which were not removed after receipt of the notice
could be removed and disposed of by DPS, the municipality, or a paro-
chial authority.86
Although the state agencies complied with the relevant laws, 87 the
varied responses received did not make compliance with the laws seam-
less.88 The replies or responses to the certified letters to the last known
owners of the vehicles held in the various staging areas discussed above
included: (1) a response; (2) no response; (3) the certified letter was
returned as undeliverable; and (4) in some circumstances, the last known
owner could not be identified due to missing VIN numbers on the vehi-
cles.89 The last three categories present problems not contemplated by
the DPS laws noted above.
Ultimately, the Louisiana legislature had to create special legisla-
tion to deal with the latter three categories. The proposed bill, section
32:477, Louisiana Revised Statutes, would have created a streamlined
procedure for the handling and disposal of motor vehicles seized during
a gubernatorially declared state of emergency.90 The bill would also
have established a procedure whereby vehicles with no responses to cer-
tified letters could be discarded by the governmental authority holding
such vehicles. 9'
Other jurisdictions would benefit from comparing their legislation
to the recently proposed Louisiana statute to assess whether preemptive
action may avoid the kinds of vehicle problems faced by Louisiana
agencies in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Other jurisdictions
that do not have such a bill could use the Louisiana bill as a model. It is
interesting to note that, although this legislation would have provided for
proper notice procedures, it took Louisiana neatly eighteen months to
attempt to cure the legislative gap exposed by the 2005 hurricanes.92 In
85. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:475(A) (2006).
86. § 32:475(B).
87. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:471; see also Op. Att'y Gen. La. 07-0037 (2007), 2007 WL
1453785.
88. Telephone Interview by Megan K. Terrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louisiana
Department of Justice, with Jackie Moore, Assistant General Counsel, Louisiana Department of
Environmental Quality, in Baton Rouge, La. (Nov. 30, 2006) [hereainfter Telephone Interview by
Megan K. Terrell].
89. Id.
90. Id.; S.B. 27, 2006 Leg., 2d Extraordinary Sess. (La. 2006).
91. Telephone Interview by Megan K. Terrell, supra note 88.
92. Legislative History, La. S.B. 27, available at http://www.legis.state.la.us/billdata/History.
asp?sessionid=062ES&billid=SB27.
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spite of this attempt, no legislation yet exists in Louisiana to close this
gap because the bill did not pass. Such a situation would be avoidable
by a proactive review and revision of relevant legislation in other
jurisdictions.
V. HUMAN REMAINS As DEBRIS
A. Problems with Unearthed Remains
Although it is commonly assumed that once buried or otherwise
interred, a human body will remain in a state of perpetual repose forever,
this is far from reality. 93 Such a belief is merely a manifestation of our
own culture's desire for death to be out of sight and out of mind as
quickly as possible.94 On numerous occasions, natural disasters have
proven that human remains can and will become disinterred, and some-
times they will be forcibly moved to a new location.95 When this
occurs, FEMA rules merely classify these remains as a form of "deb-
ris."9 6 Admittedly, FEMA does provide for some amount of identifica-
tion to be done on disinterred human remains, but it is quite limited.97
This classification of remains as debris is pervasive within FEMA in a
Sapir-Whorfian manner.98 The semantics of the classification appear to
93. EDWIN MURPHY, AFTER THE FUNERAL: THE POSTHUMOUS ADVENTURES OF FAMOUS
CORPSES, at ix-xii (1995) (noting the proclivity of folks to disinter the remains of famous
individuals over time); see also Ryan M. Seidemann, Sisters of Destruction: Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita Wreak Havoc on Southern Louisiana and Its Cemeteries, EPITAPHS, Summer 2006, at 22
(noting that, among the impacts of the 2005 hurricanes in Louisiana was the disinterment of
numerous previously deceased individuals from their "final" resting places).
94. See PETER METCALF & RICHARD HUNTINGTON, CELEBRATIONS OF DEATH: THE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF MORTUARY RITUAL 200-04 (2d ed. 1991) (describing the history of America's
fear of death and how it has evolved into our collective ignorance of the body after death).
95. See, e.g., Seidemann, supra note 94, at 22.
96. See, e.g., ANSER ANALYTIC SERVS., INC., LA. FAMILY ASSISTANCE CTR., CEMETERY
REINTERMENT ASSESSMENT 4 (2006) (noting that, because the Stafford Act does not contain
language to deal with cemetery reinterment, such matters have "been dealt with by analogy to the
rules, policies and procedures applicable to debris removal").
97. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, HURRICANES
KATRINA AND RITA: FEMA-DR-1603/1607-LA INFORMATION SHEET - # 007, at 2 (2006)
[hereinafter FEMA INFORMATION SHEET #007].
98. The theory referenced here is a concept in linguistic anthropology known as the Sapir-
Whorf Hypothesis, which essentially asserts that language constrains thought and action.
STANLEY R. BARRETT, ANTHROPOLOGY: A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THEORY AND METHOD 20 (1996).
The theory was based on Benjamin Lee Whorf's observations of workers carelessly handling fuel
drums labeled as "empty," when, in fact, they were anything but empty. The workers were lulled
into a false sense of safety by the "empty" label on the drums when, in fact, the drums contained
highly explosive fumes that were much more dangerous than the liquid fuel that made up their
original contents. In this situation, language (i.e., "empty") directed the workers to act a certain
way towards the drums. BENiAMIN LEE WHORF, The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior
to Language (1941), reprinted in LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, and Reality 135 (John B. Carroll ed.,
1956). Similarly, at FEMA, because human remains are labeled as debris, they are treated with
about as much respect. This helps to explain the attitude that lets hundreds of unidentified human
1154
HOW DO WE DEAL WITH THIS MESS?
give FEMA the perceived authority to treat deceased human beings in
the same manner that they would treat discarded refrigerators. As a
practical result, remains are subjected to minimal identification analysis
and ultimate responsibility lies with local governments. No funding is
provided for DNA analysis, intensive forensic anthropological analysis,
or reburial in anything other than a public cemetery even if the cemetery
of origin was not public.99
Until FEMA creates a new, more respectful classification for
human remains, there is little guidance available to local governments
trying to cope with warehouses full of human remains. States could
respond to FEMA by playing a similar semantics game. With respect to
reburial, because FEMA will only pay for reburial in a "public ceme-
tery," states could statutorily redefine "public cemeteries" in the follow-
ing manner:
"Public cemetery" means a cemetery owned and operated by a politi-
cal subdivision. The term "public cemetery" also includes abandoned
private cemeteries for which a political subdivision has assumed
legal, operational, and maintenance responsibility, whether explicitly
or implicitly. The term "public cemetery" also includes any privately
owned cemetery that is open to the public for the purposes of inter-
ment subject only to their ability to pay the fees of burial and other
necessary expenses.
The determining factor for the classification of a cemetery as "pub-
lic" or "private" for the purposes of Stafford Act compliance is based on
the cemetery's "ownership" rather than its "use." 1" The purpose of the
legislative fix suggested above would be to statutorily classify certain
privately owned cemeteries as "public cemeteries" for Stafford Act pur-
poses. Such cemeteries would include those consisting of burial plots or
sites sold to the public without restriction other than costs.
The functional significance of this definition, which is supported by
some jurisprudence, 101 is that all cemeteries that have open burials (i.e.,
anyone from the public who can pay can be buried there) will be consid-
ered "public" whether publicly or privately owned. Although this
semantic difference has not yet been tested, it would probably allow
FEMA to allocate funding for reburial even in privately owned
cemeteries.
As for FEMA's refusal to provide for or to conduct adequate identi-
remains that were disinterred during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita sit in warehouses with little or
no effort to return them to rest. "Why bother?" FEMA must have thought, "it's just debris."
99. See FEMA INFORMATION SHEET #007, supra note 98, at 2.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Sandoz v. Ami, Inc. (In re Provident Gen. Corp.), 33 B.R. 241, 244 (Bankr.
W.D. La. 1983).
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fication analyses, there is no clear answer to solving this problem. Leg-
islative action is needed on a federal level in this respect.' 02 Aside from
a change to FEMA's operating procedure and regulations forced by leg-
islative action, there is little hope for a change in this policy.
B. Archaeological Concerns with Unearthed Remains
Following congressional enactment of the Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act ("NAGPRA") °3 in 1990, virtually
every state in the Union created NAGPRA-like laws to protect the sanc-
tity of human remains and burial sites not contained within the confines
of traditional cemeteries." 4 Both the federal and state versions of these
laws must be considered in disaster situations.
The Louisiana version of NAGPRA, passed in 1992 and known as
the Louisiana Unmarked Human Burial Sites Preservation Act ("LUHB-
SPA"), is fairly representative of state NAGPRA-like laws. 05 The
LUHBSPA was enacted to protect "prehistoric and historic Indian, pio-
neer, and Civil War and other soldiers' burial sites"' 6 from land devel-
opment and pothunters.' 07 This law becomes relevant to debris
situations when human remains that are not identifiable as deriving from
a traditional cemetery end up, through the destructive forces of disasters,
102. Such federal legislation should provide for mandatory DNA testing of all human remains
before reburial. "Human remains" should be defined to include unknown or unidentifiable
individuals killed during a disaster, as well as unidentifiable remains disinterred by a disaster.
Legislatively assigning this requirement to FEMA would avoid FEMA's cost-cutting efforts to
later sidestep this important activity by claiming it is not required. The legislation should also
require FEMA to establish a catalog to maintain the recovered DNA information for possible later
analysis.
103. 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (2000); see Ryan M. Seidemann, Bones of Contention: A Comparative
Examination of Law Governing Human Remains from Archaeological Contexts in Formerly
Colonial Countries, 64 LA. L. REV. 545, 546 (2004) (noting that after Native Americans lobbied
for twenty years, Congress finally enacted NAGPRA to begin reburying Native American remains
and objects from museums and universities across the country); see also Ryan M. Seidemann,
Time for a Change? The Kennewick Man Case and Its Implications for the Future of the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 149, 155-58 (2003).
104. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8:671 (2006). For a review of such state laws, see
generally Michael T. Olexa et al., No Grave Like Home: Protecting the Deceased and Their Final
Resting Places from Destruction Without Going Six Feet Under, 11 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 51, 60-72
(2006), which discusses Florida's protections for unmarked graves, and Adam Goldberg,
Reaffirming McClain: The National Stolen Property Act and the Abiding Trade in Looted Cultural
Objects, 53 UCLA L. REv. 1031, 1053-54 (2006), which discusses protections for burials and
associated artifacts in Louisiana, Indiana, Washington, and Alabama.
105. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8:671-681 (2006).
106. § 8:672; cf. 25 U.S.C. § 3002 (2000) (NAGPRA applicable only to Native American
remains).
107. Pothunter is defined as "[a] person who seeks artifacts from past civilizations for personal
use, sometimes by illegal means, without adhering to professional standards of archeology." THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1374 (4th ed. 2000).
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as a part of the debris stream. 08 When this occurs, certain additional
requirements may be imposed on those dealing with debris.
Under LUHBSPA,
[a]ny person who has reason to believe he or she has discovered an
unmarked burial site or received human skeletal remains from an
unmarked burial site shall notify the law enforcement agency of the
jurisdiction where the site or remains are located within twenty-four
hours of discovery. Any person who has reason to believe he or she
has discovered or received burial artifacts shall notify the board
through the division of archaeology within seventy-two hours of the
discovery.' 09
Failure to notify the appropriate law enforcement agency carries crimi-
nal and civil penalties." 0 Once notified by the discoverer, the law
enforcement agency has an obligation to further notify the Division of
Archaeology."1
What does this mean for those on the ground dealing with debris
removal? There may very well be instances when human remains cov-
ered by NAGPRA-like state legislation, or indeed by NAGPRA itself,
end up in the debris stream. To both avoid running afoul of these laws
and to ensure that all potentially interested stakeholders and descendants
have an opportunity to participate in decisions regarding the final dispo-
sition of such disinterred remains, debris managers need to notify local
law enforcement and their state historic preservation officer or state
archaeologist in the event that human remains are found outside of
exempted cemeteries. Such notice would also be in keeping with the
much-belabored "compliance with all local, state, and federal laws" for
the purposes of reimbursement, and thus is mandatory." 2
VI. PROBLEMS
All of the foregoing proposals for how to adequately and expedi-
ently deal with debris following a disaster leave open many questions.
First, what is to be done with all of the collected debris? Second, is
there any basis for immunity from liability for local governments con-
ducting debris operations? Third, how do states with prohibitions
108. Actually, LUHBSPA applies to cemeteries not "operated under the authority of the
Louisiana Cemetery Board, or any recognized and maintained municipal, fraternal, religious, or
family cemetery." § 8:674. This may mean that sites that appear to be "traditional" cemeteries
(i.e., a distinct area with headstones marking the graves) may also be covered by the law if they
are not included in the above list of exempted cemeteries.
109. § 8:680. "Burial artifact" is defined as "any item of human manufacture or use that is in
an unmarked burial site." § 8:673.
110. § 8:680(A).
l11. § 8:680(C).
112. See FEMA-9523.13, supra note 21, and accompanying text.
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against the use of public things to benefit private property justify gov-
ernmental cleanup of private property? Fourth, what about historic pres-
ervation? In this section, we review these problems and propose
possible resolutions. This listing of potential problems raised by the
issues discussed so far in this Article is not exclusive. Rather, it merely
represents what we feel are some important issues that warrant discus-
sion. The answers to these questions will require independent investiga-
tion of local laws to elaborate on our proposals, a tangent that is not
covered in this Article.
A. What Do We Do with All of This Stuff?
As recent disasters have demonstrated, massive amounts of debris
must be managed and, ultimately, discarded.' 3 Historically, the
urgency of dealing with the debris has led to the reopening of closed
landfills, as occurred following the September 11 terrorist attacks in the
Fresh Kills Landfill on Staten Island, New York,"I4 and following Hurri-
cane Katrina in the Old Gentilly Landfill in New Orleans."' The
problems inherent in reopening closed landfills are substantial. In New
Orleans, for example, the Old Gentilly Landfill had been shut down due
to federal regulators' hazard concerns more than twenty years before
Katrina hit. 116 The public did not let officials overlook these concerns.
Concerned groups quickly filed suit against the Louisiana DEQ, citing
problems with the renewed use of the landfill, such as the fact that it did
not comply with modern environmental protection standards."' In addi-
tion to the problems experienced in the wake of the Old Gentilly reopen-
ing, one commentator has noted that there may be further problems for
such sites lurking down the road:
Both the federal government, namely the United States Army Corps
of Engineers which is the lead agency for removal of Hurricane
Katrina debris, and local municipalities, like the City of New Orle-
113. Bob Dart, Big Easy Chokes On Flood Debris Before It Can Rebuild, New Orleans Must
Deal with the Overwhelming Mountains of Garbage Left in Katrina's Wake, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Dec. 13, 2005, at IA ("Katrina left about 55 million cubic yards of debris in southeast
Louisiana .... Another 40 million to 50 million cubic yards is piled up around Mississippi, with
2 million more in the Mobile area .... ").
114. John Marzulli & Corky Siemaszko, Sad and Slow Sifting: Tons of Wreckage Scrutinized
at S.I. Landfill, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Sept. 19, 2001, at 66 (noting the reopening of the Fresh Kills
Landfill to receive World Trade Center debris).
115. Dart, supra note 113, at 1A; see also Gordon Russell, DEQ Replaces Landfill Order; But
Lawsuit Says Site Is Still Defective, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan. 25, 2006, at 1 (noting
the reopening of the Old Gentilly Landfill and some of the associated problems).
116. See Dart, supra note 113, at 1A.
117. See Russell, supra note 115, at 1. Critics raised similar concerns upon the reopening of
Fresh Kills. See, e.g., Marjorie J. Clarke, Soapbox: Con; Reopen Fresh Kills: Brilliant or
Boneheaded?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2002, § 14, at 11.
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ans, may be at risk for future CERCLA [Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act] actions on
account of actual and threatened releases of hazardous substances at
sites being used to dispose of the hurricane debris." 8
These potential problems could be avoided, or at least substantially miti-
gated, by planning ahead for debris storage.
In light of the problems caused by reopening landfills due to the
lack of other immediate options during desperate times, we recommend
that state and local officials act preemptively, during times of calm, to
identify areas where certain types of debris can be permanently stored
without potentially endangering local populations and the environment.
Such a suggestion is also supported by FEMA.I1 9 It is also advisable to
prepare contingency plans for the recycling of uncontaminated woody
and green debris, as the separation of these materials from the debris
stream will reduce the impact on landfills. Further FEMA-proposed
recycling and debris reduction methods include contracting with "large-
scale recycling operations . . . to segregate and recycle debris as it
arrives at... storage and reduction sites" and shredding non-recyclables
such as "cloth, [certain] plastic, mattresses, rugs and trash" so that vol-
ume can be reduced.12° Additionally, construction materials such as
"concrete, asphalt, gypsum, wood waste, glass, red clay bricks, clay
roofing tile, and asphalt roofing tile" can be recycled.2
The key to ensuring that as much debris as possible is recycled and
as little as possible makes it to landfills is to investigate options for
handling such matters before a disaster strikes. The lessons of the Fresh
Kills and Old Gentilly Landfills should be heeded in this respect. Our
landfills are already becoming overburdened without a massive influx of
disaster debris.' 2 2 Local and state leaders need to plan ahead to avoid
repeating the mistakes of the past.
B. Liability Issues
Another matter of some importance is the immunity of local gov-
ernments from liability for damages caused as a result of debris opera-
118. Wasik, supra note 3, at 354.
119. See FEMA-325, supra note 50, at 11-14.
120. Id. at 48. Good candidates for segregation and recycling, aside from wood and green
debris, are metals and soil. Id.
121. Id. at 49.
122. See, e.g., William Rathje & Cullen Murphy, RUBBISH! THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF GARBAGE:
WHAT OUR GARBAGE TELLS Us ABOUT OURSELvEs 238-45 (1992) (noting that we have not yet
reached crisis stage with respect to non-debris garbage, but that our output of regular waste is
remaining steady, necessitating a long-term, comprehensive approach to handling our waste issues
in the United States; part of this comprehensive plan should include measures to proactively deal
with disaster debris before it becomes a problem as it has in New Orleans).
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tions. Experience from Louisiana, in dealing with Hurricanes Katrina
(2005), Lili (2002), and Georges (1998), has demonstrated that the ques-
tion of immunity from liability is not an easy one. Below, we present
the current state of Louisiana law on this matter to demonstrate the con-
flicting jurisprudence and legal thought in one jurisdiction. Each state
will have to address this issue individually, as a review of each state's
immunity status is beyond the scope of this Article.
As a Louisiana Attorney General opinion recently noted, section
29:735, Louisiana Revised Statutes, "grants general immunity to person-
nel of the State or any political subdivision thereof, for any actions car-
ried out pursuant to the [Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency
Assistance and Disaster] Act resulting in the death of, or injury to per-
sons, or damage to property as a result of such actions.' 23 This notion
of local immunity was supported by the recent case of Castille v. Lafay-
ette City-Parish Consolidated Government,1 4 which dealt with people
injured as a result of debris operations following Hurricane Lili in 2002.
The court in this case found that section 29:735(A) did immunize the
City of Lafayette "from liability for injuries or damages sustained as a
result of the City's emergency preparedness activities."12 5
De La Cruz v. Riley,126 a case with facts similar to those in Castille,
presents a somewhat different outcome. This case involved a fatality
and injuries in an automobile accident caused by debris from Hurricane
Georges.127 For unknown reasons, however, the municipality in De La
Cruz never raised an immunity defense. Thus, although the facts are
similar to Castille, and the case deals with post-hurricane debris liabil-
ity, the legal issues upon which the court decided the case appear sub-
stantially distinguishable from Castille. If De La Cruz can be cited for
anything with respect to debris operations, however, it stands for the
notion that cleanup crews, despite their probable immune status, must
exercise the utmost care in their debris removal activities to ensure the
best possible protection of lives and property. 128
123. Op. Att'y. Gen. La. 05-0360 (2005), 2005 WL 2865900, at *3.
124. Castille v. LaFayette City-Parish Consol. Gov't, 04-1596 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/2/05); 896
So. 2d 1261, writ denied, Castille v. LaFayette City-Parish Consol. Gov't, 05-0860 (La. 5/13/05);
902 So. 2d 1029.
125. Id. at 1262.
126. De La Cruz v. Riley, 04-0607 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/2/05) 895 So. 2d 589, writ denied, De La
Cruz v. Riley, 05-0513 (La. 4/22/05); 895 So. 2d 589.
127. Id. at 591-93.
128. Id. at 594 ("We find, as the trial court did, that the Parish, therefore, had control as to the
final location of the pile of debris and it was the Parish's responsibility, once the removal
commenced, to complete the job. Mr. Riley was not in a position to control the location of the
pile of debris and ... therefore should not be liable for its location and the damaged that resulted
there from.").
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Considering this conflict in Louisiana jurisprudence, we cannot
overstate the importance of immunity provisions as part of states' emer-
gency legislation. Inclusion of these provisions could alleviate confu-
sion, like the Louisiana courts encountered, and would avoid
outstanding questions of liability that may currently dissuade local gov-
ernments from undertaking debris removal operations.
C. Using Public Things to Benefit Private Property
In Louisiana, as in many other jurisdictions, 2 9 there are clear
prohibitions against the use of public things (including manpower) to
benefit private property without appropriate compensation to the rele-
vant public body. 30 Under article VII, section 14 of the Louisiana Con-
stitution, it is a violation of the prohibition against the use of public
resources for the benefit of private interests to use public equipment or
labor to remove debris from private property in non-emergency situa-
tions, absent a preexisting obligation on behalf of the state or its political
subdivisions. 31 As long as debris removal from private property occurs
during a declared state of emergency and the debris located on private
property constitutes an "immediate threat" to public health and safety,
however, that removal activity is validly classified as serving a neces-
sary public purpose to which such prohibitions do not apply.
132
Although state-to-state variations of this prohibition make a blanket
statement of inapplicability impossible, it is probable that the public pur-
pose of returning life to some semblance of normalcy and the protection
of the public's health and safety would justify the use of public things to
conduct debris operations on private property in virtually all United
States jurisdictions.
129. Numerous other jurisdictions have similar prohibitions that should be taken into account
when considering this problem. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 6; OKLA. CONST. art. X,
§ 15(A).
130. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 14.
131. See Op. Att'y Gen. La. 05-0360 (2005), 2005 WL 2865900, at *1 ("Article VII, Section
14 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution generally prohibits the funds, credit, property or things of
value of this state or any political subdivision from being loaned, pledged or donated to or for any
person, association or public or private corporation."); Op. Att'y Gen. La. 05-0360-A (2005),
2005 WL 2865901, at * 1 ("[I]n general, the use of parish equipment and labor on private property
is prohibited by Article VII, Section 14 of the Louisiana Constitution .... ").
132. See supra Part II.B; see also Op. Att'y Gen. La. 05-0360 (2005), 2005 WL 2865900, at * 1
("[P]ublic equipment and labor, which may include more than only parish equipment and labor in
catastrophic circumstances, may be used without an authorized right of entry to protect the
residential private property of the citizens of those areas in southeast Louisiana that experienced
such severe flooding that the citizens have been unable to return to their homes in the event of a
declaration of an emergency or disaster .. "); Op. Att'y Gen. La. 05-0360-A (2005), 2005 WL
2865901.
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D. Historic Preservation Concerns
1. COMPLIANCE WITH HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAWS
During the debris removal and the reconstruction processes, it is
incumbent upon local governments to ensure the protection of historic
and archaeological resources for future research and education. Despite
the power that some local governments may have to suspend their local
historic preservation ordinances to expedite the recovery process, this
power does not eliminate the requirement that these entities must con-
tinue to comply with state and federal preservation laws and regulations.
Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act 33 requires FEMA,
in consultation with the State Historic Preservation Office, to identify
properties potentially eligible for or listed on the National Register of
Historic Places ("NRHP") and to adequately consider the effect of any
FEMA-funded undertaking, including potential demolition of private
and public property, on identified historic properties.' FEMA's his-
toric preservation responsibilities must be fulfilled before FEMA-funded
activities can be initiated.'35 If an applicant for FEMA assistance pro-
ceeds with an undertaking before FEMA has satisfied these require-
ments, FEMA reimbursement will be jeopardized. 36 Therefore, local
governments should not summarily suspend or abolish their local his-
toric preservation boards or commissions. Rather, to expedite the notice
and hearing process associated with how to deal with badly damaged
historic properties, we urge local governments to issue an ordinance or
proclamation that streamlines this process. This approach is more pru-
dent than eliminating the process altogether and thereby potentially
jeopardizing FEMA reimbursement funding if a NRHP eligible structure
or site is damaged or altered in the cleanup process.
2. ARCHAEOLOGICAL ARTIFACTS
Recent non-hurricane disaster events in Louisiana have illustrated
yet another debris problem that has neither been legislatively addressed
nor covered in the FEMA literature: what should be done with archaeo-
logical artifacts that turn up in the debris stream? States have an interest
in being able to obtain ownership of these artifacts so that they can be
maintained in a controlled manner and made available for research pur-
poses. "'37 It is a generally accepted tenet, however, that archaeological
133. 16 U.S.C.A. § 470(0 (2007).
134. FEMA-322, supra note 13, at 108-09.
135. FEMA-325, supra note 50, at 35-37.
136. FEMA-322, supra note 13, at 89.
137. Such an interest derives from general archaeology ethical principles, which hold that
preservation of archaeological remains should be accomplished so as to benefit society as a whole
1162 [Vol. 61:1135
HOW DO WE DEAL WITH THIS MESS?
artifacts derived from private land are generally the private property of
the landowner. 138 Consequently, multiple parties may vie for control
and ownership of artifacts when they turn up in the debris stream. The
issue of archaeological artifact debris admittedly represents the least
clear issue we analyze in this Article. In fact, this area of law is ripe for
legislation at the state and local levels precisely because it is so unclear;
relevant legislation could avoid problems before they occur.
Because government entities or their contractors are often the ones
dealing with debris removal, they will most likely be the first custodians
of these artifacts. The question then is whether the government has to
give the private landowners a right of first refusal to the artifacts. Since
archaeological remains located on private property are the property of
the private landowner, if the artifacts are clearly identifiable as having
come from one landowner's tract, the government should notify those
landowners and allow them the right to reclaim their property. A sug-
gestion that it would be more beneficial for educational and research
purposes for the government to retain the materials should accompany
that notice.
However, when a disaster is widespread and the debris of multiple
landowners is commingled, making it unclear whose tract the artifacts
have derived from, the solution is not as simple. It may be unconstitu-
tional for a government to return the artifacts to individuals without evi-
dence of their place of origin because doing so may constitute a
divestiture of the true landowner's private property rights in the event
that the artifacts are given to an incorrect recipient. There seems to be
no clear or correct answer regarding what to do in such situations.
As with other scenarios discussed in this Article, a local govern-
ment's best option in dealing with archaeological artifact debris is to
first analyze applicable state and local laws to determine if they provide
any guidance. In the absence of such guidance, we suggest that the gov-
ernmental entity in possession of the artifacts transfer custody to the
relevant state archaeological authority. This authority could then hold
the artifacts until a claim is made by a landowner and that claim can be
evaluated. The authority is likely under a duty to advertise that it has the
through their study. See generally PRINCIPLES OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL ETHics (Soc'y for Am.
Archaeology 1996), available at http://www.saa.org/aboutSAA/committees/ethics/principles.html.
Private ownership stifles this objective because the public seldom has an opportunity to view
privately owned artifacts or to learn anything about our shared human history from them. States
have enacted many of their preservation laws to forward this dogma. See, e.g., Olexa et al., supra
note 104, at 61 (noting that the Florida legislature has enacted archaeological laws "to further the
goals of preserving and protecting the state's cultural heritage").
138. See Olexa et al., supra note 104, at 60 ("[O]wnership of artifacts generally depends upon
where they are found. Artifacts discovered on private property belong to the landowner.").
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artifacts and to allow people to make claims for them. In the event that
no claim is made, the state authority should continue to curate the arti-
facts until the expiration of time for private claims to the property. At
the expiration of the claims period, the government would become the
owner of the artifacts through abandonment.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is impossible in one article to identify every possible debris-
related problem that any particular U.S. jurisdiction may encounter in
the wake of a disaster. Yet, we hope that our discussion of the basic
legal procedures for initiating the debris cleanup process and the lessons
learned in Louisiana after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita can help other
similarly situated jurisdictions expedite future recovery processes.
The simple reality, however, is that disasters will occur no matter
how prepared jurisdictions are. It is not a matter of if, but a matter of
when. The entire nation is at risk of being struck by some type of disas-
ter at some time. The best way to deal with the fallout from these disas-
ters is to be prepared for them to the best extent possible. State and local
governments should act now to ensure that mechanisms, both legal and
logistical, are in place to deal with problems like debris management.
Make a plan, and make it now, in advance of the next inevitable disaster.
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APPENDIX 1. A PROPOSED DEBRIS MANAGEMENT STATUTE
The following is a proposed statute dealing with many of the short-
comings in state laws this Article identified. This proposed statute is
intended for use as a model for state legislation. When constructing this
proposed statute, we saw no need to reinvent the wheel, so to speak, on
all matters. As such, large portions of the proposed statute have been
quoted, with minor alterations (noted in brackets), from existing state
statutes. We also identify which states, other than the ones whose stat-
utes are actually quoted, have similar provisions in their statutes. Many
states already have some of the provisions that we feel are important; we
list these, too. No state has a comprehensive set of rules, like the one we
propose infra, to deal with debris management issues following a natural
or anthropogenic disaster. Thus, we recommend that states with some
provisions related to these issues consolidate their existing laws into one
chapter and amend those laws with adaptations of our proposals where
necessary. States with no such laws should enact something akin to our
proposal as soon as possible. The use of our statute's original sections
(identifiable as the portions not setoff by quotation marks) should help
to close the gaps in existing laws and avoid many of the problems we
identified in this Article.
Section 1. Right-of-Entry to Private Property in a State of Emer-
gency or Major Disaster.
(A) "When the Governor has declared a [state of emergency], or the
President, at the request of the Governor, has declared a major
disaster or emergency to exist in this state, the Governor may" :139
(1) "through the use of state [or municipal] agencies [or private
contractors of state or municipal agencies], clear from pub-
licly or privately owned land or water debris and wreckage
that may threaten public health, safety, or [public or private]
property;" 1"
139. ALASKA STAT. § 26.23.110(a) (2006); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 28-9c(a) (West
2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 29C.6(4) (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ArN. tit. 37-B, § 744(4)(A)
(2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 10-3-315(1) (2005); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 401.145(1) (West
2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 36(a) (2005); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 23, § 1134(a) (2005).
140. ALASKA STAT. § 26.23.110(a)(1); see also CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 28-9c(a)(1) (West
2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 29C.6(4) (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 37-B, § 744(4)(A)(1)
(2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 10-3-315(1)(a) (2005); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 29(3) (McKinney 2007);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-21(1) (2005); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 401.145(1)(a) (West 2005);
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 25, § 172n (2003); TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 418.023(a) (Vernon 2006); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 36(a)(1) (2005); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 23, § 1134(a)(1) (2005).
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(2) through the use of state or municipal agencies or private con-
tractors of state or municipal agencies, "access property
using privately owned roads for [the] purposes of providing
. ..debris cleanup;"'' 41
(3) "apply for and accept funds from the federal government and
use those funds to make grants to a political subdivision for
the purpose of removing debris or wreckage from publicly or
privately owned land or water."' 14 2
(4) "[w]henever the Governor provides for clearance of debris or
wreckage [pursuant to a declaration described in subdivision
(A) of this section], employees of [state or municipal agen-
cies or private contractors of state or municipal agencies] are
authorized to enter upon private land or waters and perform
any tasks necessary to the [debris] removal or clearance
operation."'1
3
(B) "Authority under this section shall not be exercised[, subject to the
exceptions in subdivision D of this Section,] unless the affected
political subdivision, corporation, organization or individual own-
ing such property shall first present an unconditional authorization
for removal of such debris or wreckage from public and private
property and, in the case of removal of debris or wreckage from
private property, shall first agree to indemnify the state against any
claim arising from such removal."' 44
(C) If, at any time, services for debris cleanup or demolition or any
other activity contemplated by this Chapter are rendered on private
property, such services "shall be limited to the cleanup of debris[,
141. ALA. CODE § 45-2-140 (2006).
142. ALASKA STAT. § 26.23.11 0(a)(2) (2006); see also IOWA CODE ANN. § 29C.6(4) (West
2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 37-B, § 744(4)(A)(2) (2006); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 10-3-
315(1)(b) (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-21(2) (2005); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 401.145(1)(b) (West 2005); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 418.023(b) (Vernon 2006); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20, § 36(a)(2) (2005); V.I. CODE ANN. Tit. 23, § 1134(A)(2) (2005).
143. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 37-B, § 744(4)(B)(2) (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 10-3-
315(2)(b) (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-21(2) (2005); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 401.145(3)
(West 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 30-15.4-2(b) (2006); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 418.023(d)
(Vernon 2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 36(c) (2005); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 23, § 1134(c) (2005).
144. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 28-9(c)(b)(1) (West 2007); see also IowA CODE ANN.
§ 29C.6(4) (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 37-B, § 744(4)(B)(1) (2006); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 10-3-315(2)(a) (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-21(2) (2005); OR. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 401.145(2) (West 2005); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 25, § 172n (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 30-15.4-2(a)
(2006); TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 418.023(c) (Vernon 2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 36(b)
(2005); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 23, § 1134(b) (2005).
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demolition] and repair damage caused by a . . disaster [to the
extent that such work is essential to protect private property from
further damage. Such services] shall not be utilized for work relat-
ing to general home improvements [or any other non-disaster
related work on private property]."' 45
(D) (1) In the event that it is not practicable or possible to obtain
authorization or indemnification for the removal of debris
from public or private property by reason of being unable to
locate or identify the owner, the state or municipal agency or
the private contractor of the state or municipal agency may
enter upon such property (a) for the express purpose of carry-
ing out debris removal and demolition operations that are
necessary for the protection of the public health, safety, or
welfare; or (b) for the purpose of securing public or private
property from further damage, destruction, or conversion
until such time as the owner can be identified or located. 146
(2) Once the owner of such property has been identified or
located, all practicable due process shall be afforded the
owner.
Section 2. Vehicles Damaged During a Disaster.
(A) Notice to buyers and the Office of Motor Vehicles.
(1) "No person, firm or corporation shall knowingly sell in this
state any motor vehicle the mechanical or electrical system
of which has been previously damaged by the ravages of a
• ..disaster .. .to an extent which rendered the vehicle
inoperable for any period of time, unless notice, in writing,
of the fact of such damage, the nature and extent thereof and
the date and location in which it occurred is first given to
each buyer of such motor vehicle. For the purposes of this
Section, a vehicle shall be deemed to have been rendered
inoperable if, as a result of the damage caused by the ...
disaster, it would be necessary for such vehicle to undergo
repair in order to pass inspection in the manner provided [by
the Office of Motor Vehicles]."' 47
145. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2202(west 2006).
146. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 418.023(c) (Vernon 2006); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 23,
§ 1134(a)(1) (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 36(a)(1) (2005).
147. N.Y. GEN. Bus. § 396-k (McKinney 2007).
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(2) Nor shall any motor vehicle be sold in this state the body or
interior of which has previously been damaged by the
ravages of a disaster to an extent which required replacement
of body or interior parts, "unless notice, in writing, of the fact
of such damage, the nature and extent thereof and the date
and location in which it occurred is first given to each buyer
of such motor vehicle." '148 For the purposes of this Section,
interior damage includes the replacement of interior carpet in
any portion of the vehicle.
(3) "Violation of this Section shall constitute a
misdemeanor."' 49
(4) If any vehicle has been damaged, whether sold or not,
according to subdivisions A(l) or A(2) of this Section, the
owner and the vehicle's insurer shall, within ninety days of
completion of repairs to the vehicle, mail notice of the dam-
ages and the repairs to the Office of Motor Vehicles. The
insurer is only required to comply with this subdivision if a
claim was made.
(B) "Abandoned motor vehicles; gubernatorial declared state of emer-
gency; disposal by state and political subdivisions; notice require-
ments; disposition of proceeds.
(1) If a state agency or political subdivision seizes a motor vehi-
cle that was illegally parked, stationed, or abandoned on a
public street or highway within a [county] in which a guber-
natorially declared state of emergency is in effect at the time
of seizure, the provisions of this [subdivision] shall apply to
the disposition of the motor vehicle, and the provisions of
this [subdivision] shall supersede the provisions of [normal,
non-disaster abandoned vehicle laws] to the extent that they
are in conflict.
(2) (a) Within ten days after seizing the motor vehicle, the state
agency or political subdivision seizing the motor vehi-
cle shall mail a written notice, by certificate of mailing,
to the owner of the motor vehicle at his last known
address on file with the [Office of Motor Vehicles].
The notice shall include the following information:
148. Id.
149. Id.
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(i) The name of the state agency or political subdivi-
sion holding the motor vehicle and the manner in
which it can be claimed.
(ii) That in order to claim the motor vehicle, the
owner must pay all costs and charges imposed by
the seizing authority for the removal and storage
of the motor vehicle.
(iii) That in lieu of claiming the motor vehicle, the
owner may remit fifteen dollars to the state
agency or political subdivision holding the motor
vehicle together with a completed certificate of
authority to remove and dispose of the abandoned
motor vehicle. The certificate of authority shall
be on a form prescribed by the [agency] and shall
be sent to the owner of the abandoned motor
vehicle with this notice and with a self-addressed,
stamped return envelope.
(b) The state agency or political subdivision shall retain
adequate documentation concerning the mailing of this
notice for no less than three years.
(3) The motor vehicle shall be considered abandoned to the state
or political subdivision if the owner of the motor vehicle has
not done any of the following within three months of the
mailing of the notice provided for in subdivision [B(2)] of
this [subdivision]:
(a) Responded to the letter.
(b) Remitted the fifteen dollars and a certificate of
authority.
(c) Claimed the motor vehicle.
(4) If the motor vehicle is considered abandoned, the state
agency or political subdivision holding the motor vehicle
shall send a final notice to the owner of the motor vehicle
indicating its intent to dispose of the abandoned motor vehi-
cle. Final notification shall be provided for in accordance
with the following procedure:
(a) (i) The state agency or political subdivision shall
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mail a final notice, by certificate of mailing, to
the owner of the abandoned motor vehicle at his
last known address informing such owner that the
state agency or political subdivision is holding the
abandoned motor vehicle.
(ii) The final notice shall inform the owner that the
vehicle shall be sold to the highest bidder,
crushed, dismantled, or otherwise disposed of
unless the owner, on or before the date of dispo-
sal, claims the motor vehicle and pays to the seiz-
ing authority all costs, charges, and fees incurred
by the seizing authority for the detention and stor-
age of the abandoned motor vehicle.
(b) The state or political subdivision shall also publish an
advertisement in the official journal of the state and the
[county] or municipality in which the vehicle was aban-
doned, on no fewer than three separate occasions within
a ten day period, prior to the date of disposal of the
abandoned motor vehicle. The advertisement shall con-
tain the following information:
(i) A complete list of the abandoned motor vehicles
to be disposed of.
(ii) A description of each vehicle and, to the extent
practicable, the name of the last registered owner
of each abandoned motor vehicle.
(iii) The date and location in which the abandoned
motor vehicles will be disposed of together with
notice that the abandoned motor vehicles may be
disposed of individually or in lots.
(c) The state agency or political subdivision shall retain
adequate documentation concerning the mailing of the
final notice, advertisement in the official journal, and
appraisal for no less than three years.
(5) Prior to disposal of the abandoned motor vehicle, the seizing
authority shall have the motor vehicle appraised by a compe-
tent appraiser.
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(6) If the state agency or political subdivision receives no
response from the owner within thirty days of mailing the
final notice, the state agency or political subdivision shall
proceed with disposal of the abandoned motor vehicle with-
out the necessity of further notice to the owner of the aban-
doned motor vehicle. Upon final disposal of an abandoned
vehicle, the state agency or political subdivision shall notify
the office of motor vehicles of such disposition.
(7) All funds received from the disposal of an abandoned motor
vehicle under the provisions of this [subdivision] shall be set
aside into a separate account established by the seizing
authority. If, within one year following the date of disposal
of the abandoned motor vehicle, the owner of a disposed of
motor vehicle presents proof of his ownership, the owner
shall be entitled to his share of the proceeds realized from the
disposal of the motor vehicle minus all costs, fees, and
expenses associated with the detention, storage, and sale of
the abandoned vehicle. Any funds not claimed within one
year following the date of disposal of the abandoned motor
vehicle shall be deposited into the general fund of the seizing
authority.
(8) For purposes of this Section, 'owner' shall mean the last reg-
istered owner of a motor vehicle, the holder of any lien on a
vehicle, and any other person with an ownership interest in a
vehicle."1 50
Section 3. Debris Management Plan; Debris Recycling.
(A) "The [state, through its environmental management agencies,]
shall develop and implement a comprehensive debris management
plan for debris generated by state and federally declared disasters
and debris generated from the rebuilding efforts resulting from
these disasters. The management plan shall be to reuse and
recycle material and to divert debris from disposal in landfills to
the maximum extent practical, efficient, and expeditious in a man-
ner that is protective of human health and the environment. The
plan shall be consistent with state and federal law and shall not
supersede any ordinance adopted by a local governing authority.
In developing such plan, the secretary shall utilize the following
debris management practices in order of priority, to the extent they
150. S.B. 27, 2006 Leg., 2d Extraordinary Sess. (La. 2006).
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are appropriate, practical, efficient, timely, and have available
funding:
(1) Recycling and composting.
(2) Weight reduction.
(3) Volume reduction.
(4) Incineration or co-generation.
(5) Land disposal." 151
(B) "Green and woody debris may be used in coastal restoration
projects, as compost, or as fuel. Green and woody debris shall not
be disposed of in a landfill as the first option; however, such debris
may be used as a component of the cover system for a landfill or a
means for providing erosion control."15 2
(C) "The comprehensive debris management plan shall utilize the most
environmentally beneficial management techniques consistent
with the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the state, to
the extent funding is available, and shall promote the efficient and
expeditious management of the debris."' 153
Section 4. Historic Preservation.
(A) "No structure that is listed on the National Register of Historic
Places, on the [State] Register of Historic Places, or on any local
public register of historic places [, or is potentially eligible for
such listing,] and that has been damaged due to a . . . disaster...
may be demolished, destroyed, or significantly altered, except for
restoration to preserve or enhance its historical values, unless the
structure presents an imminent threat to the public of bodily harm
or of damage to adjacent property, or unless the State [Historic
Preservation Office] determines . . . that the structure may be
demolished, destroyed, or significantly altered."'1 54
(B) "Any local government may apply to the State [Historic Preserva-
tion Office] for its determination as to whether a structure meeting
the description set forth in subdivision (A) of this Section shall be
151. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2413.1(B) (2006).
152. § 30:2413.1(C).
153. § 30:2413.1(D).
154. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 5028(a) (West 2007).
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demolished, destroyed, or significantly altered." 5
(C) Representatives from the State Historic Preservation Office or
from the Historic Preservation Office of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, or private contractors hired by the state and
having the same professional qualifications as the employees of
the State Historic Preservation Office, shall
(1) accompany all demolition crews working in the declared dis-
aster area;
(2) have the authority to halt demolition activities in order to
make an assessment of the historic value of structures;
(3) be onsite to monitor and document demolition activities on
any structure determined to be listed on the registers in subdi-
vision (A) of this Section;
(4) make recommendations for structures slated for demolition to
be added to local, state, or federal registers of historic places;
and
(5) to the maximum extent practicable, salvage all information of
historic or scientific value from historic structures that are
slated for demolition. Such information includes, but is not
limited to, photographs of the structure, design plans of the
structure and any significant architectural features, and actual
artifacts from the structure.
(D) In the event that the Governor has declared a state of emergency,
or the President, at the request of the Governor, has declared a
major disaster or emergency to exist in this state,
(1) local governing authorities shall not suspend or disband any
municipal agency tasked with protecting historic structures;
(2) nor shall any state governing authority suspend or disband
any state agency tasked with protecting historic structures;
(3) nor shall any state statutes or regulations or municipal ordi-
nances relating to the protection of historic structures be
suspended.
155. § 5028(b).
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Section 5. Unearthed Human Remains Found Following a
Disaster.
(A) For the purposes of this section, "unearthed human remains"
includes any and all human remains that have been disinterred,
whether from a cemetery or other place of repose, by the forces of
a disaster.
(B) Upon the discovery of unearthed human remains, the discoverer
shall contact local law enforcement and the state archaeologist and
provide them with the location of the remains. Local law enforce-
ment and the state archaeologist shall coordinate efforts to deter-
mine if the remains are classified as being under the jurisdiction of
an established cemetery or of the state's unmarked human burials
laws.
(C) At any time, should it be determined that any unearthed human
remains derived from a known or unknown archaeological site,
jurisdiction over such remains shall rest with the state archaeolo-
gist. The final disposition of such remains shall be controlled by
the relevant portions of the state's unmarked human burials law or
the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act,156
whichever is applicable.
(D) In no event shall any unearthed human remains be reburied, unless
their identity is readily obtainable, without the extraction, by a
forensic scientist, of a sample sufficient to conduct DNA testing
on for identification purposes. It shall be the duty of the state
health department to curate such samples until such time as they
are used to perform DNA tests. Such DNA tests shall be con-
ducted only if sufficient funding is available. The results of such
tests shall be retained by the state health department for the pur-
poses of identifying next of kin.
(E) In no event shall any unearthed human remains be reburied, unless
their identity is readily obtainable, without the completion of a
complete forensic anthropological analysis of the remains and x-
rays of the dentition for the purposes of identification. The results
of the analysis and the x-rays shall be curated by the state health
department in the same file as the DNA information in subdivision
D of this Section.
156. 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (2000).
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(E) Once the analyses and sampling described in subdivisions D and E
of this Section are complete, and should no positive identification
of unearthed human remains be made, the authority holding the
remains shall reinter the remains in a manner to be prescribed by
law. Such interment shall be in an active public cemetery. The
grave shall be marked with a permanent marker that identifies the
remains by the state health department file number. A photograph
of the grave, along with global positioning system coordinates of
the burial location shall be sent to the state health department. The
state health department shall curate this documentation in the same
file as the information in subdivisions D and E of this Section.
(F) "Except for analysis on quality control samples, [DNA] tests per-
formed on all unidentified human remains ... shall be used only
for law enforcement identification purposes or to assist in the
recovery or identification of human remains from disasters."' 57
(G) Subdivisions D through F of this Part shall not be interpreted to
supersede the state's unmarked burials law or the Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act.'58
(H) All cemeteries, whether public or private, following a disaster,
shall notify local law enforcement and the state health department
of any burials that appear to have been disturbed to the point that
remains may have been unearthed by the disaster.
Section 6. Immunity from Liability.
(A) "Except in cases of willful misconduct, gross negligence or bad
faith, any state [or municipal] employee [or employee of a private
contractor for a state or municipal agency], complying with orders
of the Governor and performing duties pursuant thereto under
[Sections 1 through 5 of this Chapter] shall not be liable for death
of or injury to persons or damage to property occurring during
performance of those duties."'' 59
157. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:659(D) (2006).
158. 25 U.S.C. § 3001.
159. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 37-B, § 744(4)(B)(3) (2006); see also ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.65.091; CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8657 (West 2007); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-108.3
(West 2006); HAW. REv. STAT. § 128-18 (2006); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3305/21 (West 2006);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4201(2005); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 44.023 (West 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 83A-13.1 (West 2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-21(2) (2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
76, § 5.8 (West 2006); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 401.145(4) (West 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 30-
15.4-2(c) (2006); TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 418.023(d) (Vernon 2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 36(d) (2005); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 23, § 1134(d) (2005).
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